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Changing Parties, Changing Partisans  
The Personalization of Partisan Attachments in Western Europe 
 
Abstract: This paper investigates the effects of the deep transformations undergone by West 
European class-mass parties on their relationship with the electorate. Attention is devoted to 
the changing nature of individuals’ partisan attachments, which we hypothesize to have 
shifted from a reflection of previous social and ideological identities to the result of individual 
attitudes towards more visible partisan objects. The main objective of this analysis is to show 
the foremost part played by voters’ attitudes towards one of these ‘objects’ –party leaders– in 
determining psychological attachments with the parties. Our analysis concentrates on the two 
main cleavage-based parties in Britain, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands in the period 
between 1990 and the most recent election. The empirical analysis shows the constantly 
declining ability of social identities (class and religious) to predict individual feelings of 
partisan attachment, as well as the correspondingly growing part played by voters’ attitudes 
towards party leaders. The discussion of our findings points to the crucial role that political 
psychology can play in our understanding of democratic elections’ outcomes. 
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Until recently the study of political attitudes and behavior has been rather ‘situationist’ 
in character, and hitherto dominated by approaches emphasizing the role of macro-social 
factors such as class, region and religion (‘t Hart, 2009). However, the decline of traditional 
cleavage structures and their ability to shape the political competition (Franklin et al., 1992) 
has made such an approach progressively less useful in understanding the relationship 
between the main political actors (the parties) and contemporary reasoning voters (Popkin, 
1991). 
The widespread erosion of traditional socio-political alignments in advanced industrial 
democracies (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000) has in fact resulted in a progressive 
individualization of vote choices, which involves “a shift away from a style of electoral 
decision-making based on social group and/or party cues toward a more individualized and 
inwardly oriented style of political choice”, mainly based on “policy preferences, performance 
judgments, or candidate images” (Dalton, 1996: 346). This occurrence has made necessary for 
class-mass parties to reshape their appeal in order to extend the electoral basin beyond the 
socio-ideological cleavages to which they usually referred (Mair et al., 2004). This process of 
transformation, already previewed by Downs (1957) and further detailed by Kirchheimer 
(1966), found its symbolical culmination in the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 – a turning 
point after which parties could not be thought anymore as representing “bodies of particular 
principle”, but rather as “vote maximizing agents without any real ideologies of their own” 
(Daalder, 2002: 52). As a result, contemporary catch-all parties have become de-ideological 
in nature, highly flexible in their issue programmes (Farrell and Webb, 2000), and tend to 
base increasingly their election profiles on features more engaging to voters – such as the 
leadership factor (Evans and Andersen, 2005; Farrell, 1996).  




The emergence of television as main source of political information for a vast majority 
of Western electorates has been crucial in emphasizing the role of political leaders at the 
expense of parties, making the latter “more dependent in their communications with voters on 
the essentially visual and personality-based medium of television” (Mughan, 2000: 129). 
Although any single answer to the question of how media shape politics can only be a partial 
one (Couldry, 2009) it is hard to deny that television-based campaigning has progressively 
accentuated personality factors at the expense of more substantive programmatic goals 
(Campus, 2010). In such context, leaders may well find themselves better able to shape the 
electoral appeal of their own parties (Curtice, 2003).  
In this article, we will attempt to assess the effects of these transformations on the 
parties’ relationship with their supporters. In particular, our attention will be devoted to the 
changing nature and content of individuals’ feelings of psychological attachment with 
political parties. In spite of the numerous contestations targeted to the concept at both 
theoretical and empirical level (Budge et al., 1976), we remain convinced of the enduring 
importance of partisanship in cross-national research (this conviction being shared with, 
among others: Richardson, 1991; Holmberg, 1994; Berglund et al., 2005; Schmitt, 2009). As 
long as party-based democracies are around, “people’s different relationships with the major 
actors – the parties – must be conceptualized and measured” (Holmberg, 2007: 566).  
There are many routes by which voters may come to think of themselves as ‘partisans’ 
(Bartle and Bellucci, 2009). In its classic formulation set forth in The American Voter 
(Campbell et al., 1960) partisanship is conceived as a long-term affective orientation to a 
political party, which is rooted in early socialization and based on an objective location in the 
social structure. Nowadays the political relevance of traditional cleavage structures is 
markedly smaller than it was when the concept of party identification was first conceived 
(Oskarson, 2005). However, we agree with Berglund et al. (2005) that “party identification 




should not necessarily decline in the slipstream of the decline of the relationship between 
social structure and party system” (107). Indeed, in recent years a new understanding of the 
concept in terms of modern attitude theory has emerged (Weisberg and Greene, 2003). In this 
perspective partisanship is interpreted as a “psychological tendency that is expressed by 
evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favor or disfavor” (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993: 
1). At the outset of this favorable (or unfavorable) partisan attitudes there are a number of 
factors more strictly political and ‘dispositionist’ in character (Houghton, 2009) such as issue 
proximity, past performance, or favorable leader evaluations (Bartle and Bellucci, 2009: 201).  
Our analysis moves from the assumption that, like all political attitudes, partisanship is 
responsive to the set of alternatives available (i.e., attitude objects) in a political system at a 
particular point in time (Crewe, 1976). Previous studies have indeed demonstrated how 
specific party characteristics contribute to distinctive types of partisanship (Richardson, 
1991). Therefore, the erosion traditional social cleavages and the resulting transformation of 
former class-mass parties into catch-all lead us to hypothesize that partisan loyalties have 
shifted accordingly from a mere reflection of previous social and ideological identities (as 
postulated by the Michigan conception of party identification) to the result of individual 
attitudes towards more visible partisan objects, such as their leaders (Converse, 1995).  
The relevance of our research question is twofold. First, it is electorally relevant. 
Contemporary partisans share with their traditional counterparts a strong propensity to vote 
for the party they identify (Berglund et al., 2005). In this sense, we deem important to 
understand the psychological dynamics underlying the process by which they come to feel 
attached to a specific political party. At the same time, our findings can be relevant from a 
methodological point of view. By showing the foremost effect exerted by individual attitudes 
as main drivers of one’s partisanship, we hint at the crucial role that political psychology can 




play in answering the often neglected how question (Houghton, 2009) of voting behavior 
research.  
The choice of cases under analysis is based on the Most Different Systems Design. We 
have chosen four established parliamentary democracies in Western Europe – Britain, 
Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands – connoted by sharp differences in terms of electoral 
system, size of party system and structure of political competition. Our attention will be 
concentrated on the main representatives of cleavage-based parties (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967) 
in each of these countries1. The time period under analysis spans the two decades between the 
fall of the Berlin Wall and the most recent national election for which National Election Study 
data is available2. By means of multinomial logistic regression, we show the constantly 
declining ability of ‘identities’ (e.g., class and religious) to predict individual feelings of 
partisan attachment, as well as the correspondingly growing part played by voters’ attitudes 
towards issues, performance evaluation, and party leaders – the latter having become 
nowadays of crucial relevance in each country under analysis. Evidence about the direction of 
the causal flow (e.g., positive attitudes towards leaders cause feelings of attachment to 
parties) is also presented. 
The article proceeds as follows: we first review the relevant literature on partisanship, 
in order to formulate our research hypotheses (Section 2); these are tested against the four 
cases at hand (rationale for the cases chosen in Section 3) at both bivariate (Section 4) and 
multivariate level (Section 5). Finally, the results of the empirical analysis are discussed along 
with their relevance and implications for the field of political psychology (Section 6). 
                                                 
1 We decided to concentrate on (former) class-mass parties alone as the process outlined in this paper (e.g., 
decline of ideologies and cleavage-based politics, resulting transformations at the party level) can be thought to 
exert its effects mainly on the relationship between voters and this kind of parties. 
2 Presumably, the process we are hypothesizing started way before 1990 due to longer-term trends of 
modernization and secularization among Western societies. However, we chose to focus on the last two decades 
in virtue of the obvious acceleration ignited to the process of party transformation by the fall of Berlin Wall, as 
well as for reasons of data availability (the first Italian National Election Study has in fact been conducted in 
1990). 




2. Two Conceptions of Partisanship: Identity and Attitudinal Approaches 
Different routes can lead an individual to think of himself as ‘partisan’. Yet, there are 
essentially two explanations of this tendency in the literature: namely, the identity and 
attitudinal approaches (Bartle and Bellucci, 2009). The identity approach describes party 
identification as “the individual’s affective orientation to an important group-object in his 
environment” (Campbell et al., 1960: 121). This sense of ‘we feeling’ can be focused either 
on primary (e.g., race, religion, social class) or secondary groups (e.g., the parties 
themselves), and it is mainly product of early socialization. The analytical usefulness of the 
concept lies in its relative stability and distance from the vote choice. Party identification is in 
fact conceived as an unmoved mover: that is, a pre-political attitude (hence supposedly 
immune from political and economic short-term influences), which is nonetheless able to 
shape the individuals’ political world-view in a way that accords with their partisan 
orientation.  On these bases, partisanship is thought to be cause – but not consequence – of 
less stable attitudes and opinions about political objects (e.g., political events, issues and 
candidates). To put it sharply, the identity approach sees partisanship as “an exogenous 
variable affecting politics but not being affected by politics” (Holmberg, 2007: 563).  
Reciprocal causation, however, can represent a problem in this context. As it has been 
observed, “[p]arty identification is shaping behaviors, attitudes, and perceptions at the same 
time as it is shaped by attitudes and perceptions” (ibid., 562). Claims of this sort have led to 
an intrinsically different view of partisanship – simply, a positive/negative disposition toward 
an attitude object (Converse, 1995). Already the authors of The American Voter spoke about 
the role of attitudes as “potential agents of change in the individual’s basic partisan 
orientation” (Campbell et al., 1960: 135). In the 1970s a group of ‘revisionists’ (Fiorina, 
2002) openly questioned the non-political definition of party identification set forth by 
Campbell and colleagues, putting emphasis on the importance of cognitive factors as 




formative aspects behind individuals’ partisan alignments. A number of studies explored in 
detail the dynamic relationship between partisan affiliations and short-term attitudes, 
demonstrating the absence of a clear causal sequence from the former to the latter (Page and 
Jones, 1979; Fiorina, 1981).  
In drawing a sharp distinction between these two approaches, we do not imply that one 
perspective is correct at the expense of the other. Following Rosema (2006), we rather believe 
that 
 
“partisanship may be conceptualized in terms of identification as well as evaluation. Which 
conceptualization one prefers will depend on how one views political parties (as groups to 
which voters may belong, or as organizations that voters may like or dislike)” (Rosema, 2006: 
470). 
 
Like all political attitudes, partisanship is supposedly responsive to the particular set of 
political alternatives available in the political system (Crewe, 1976). Therefore, the nature and 
shape of partisan ties must be influenced, to at least some extent, by the specific 
characteristics of political parties themselves (Richardson, 1991). Old cleavage parties were 
characterized by a tight link with their respective social milieu (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). In 
this sense, they could be conceived as groups to which partisans ‘belonged’ (Butler and 
Stokes, 1969; Thomassen, 1976; Parisi and Pasquino, 1977). However, the process of 
transformation undergone by Western class-mass parties in the last decades has led these 
parties to a progressive de-attachment from the socio-ideological cleavages to which they 
usually referred (Mair et al., 2004). According to the original Michigan conception of party 
identification, favorable attitudes towards partisan objects are caused by long-term loyalties 
based on primary group memberships. But if it is true (as we expect) that contemporary 




partisanship is not anymore a consequence of socialization forces, then we can assume that 
individual feelings of closeness to parties are caused exactly by those attitudes that the 
identity approach conceive as consequences of pre-existing identifications. Based on this 
assumption, we hypothesize that the process of party change has transformed the nature of 
partisanship from a reflection of previous social identities to the product of individual 
attitudes towards parties and partisan objects. 
Among the possible sources of favorable attitudes towards the parties, the literature 
assigns a crucial place to issue preferences. The standard model of rational decision-making 
based on issues, as applied to the study of voting behavior, is the spatial model developed by 
Anthony Downs (1957). Voters and parties are placed on a left-right continuum – a “super-
issue which summarizes the programmes of opposing groups” (Inglehart and Klingemann, 
1976: 244). In such model, issue proximity is responsible for the promotion of positive (or 
negative) attitudes towards each of the parties (Budge et al., 1976), and eventually determines 
voters’ choices. Another important source of attitudes towards parties is represented by 
valence issues – that is, instances in which there is a wide consensus over what goals are 
desirable, but there is conflict over which party is best at delivering them (Stokes, 1963). 
Attitudes can derive in this case by either retrospective evaluations of party performance 
(Fiorina, 1981) or prospective competence assessments (Bellucci, 2006).  
Attitudes towards parties can also originate from voters’ evaluations of other objects 
strongly associated with the image of parties themselves, such as their leaders (Page and 
Jones, 1979). Already in 1968, V. O. Key anticipated a later, cognitive view of partisanship 
hypothesizing that “[l]ike or dislike of a political personality…bring shifts in party 
identification” (Key, 1968; quoted in Clarke et al., 2004). According to this interpretation, 
partisanship is moved by individual attitudes toward the party as ‘personified’ by the leader, 




and therefore feelings of closeness should be brought back to the party ‘in the form of its 
leader’ (Barisione, 2009).  
Indeed, we contend that this interpretation is ever more appropriate in the light of the 
progressive personalization of politics in Western democracies (McAllister, 2007). In the last 
decades, there is little doubt that party leaders have increasingly gained importance to both 
political communication and electoral competition vis-à-vis their parties in almost every 
Western democracy. Impressionistic evidence of this trend include the substitution of leader 
images for party symbols during election campaigns (McAllister, 1996), the media’s 
increasing propensity to mention candidates rather than the parties they belong to (Dalton et 
al., 2000), and the tendency to portray executives in a personalized fashion – these being 
routinely labeled after the name of their leaders (Bean and Mughan, 1989). 
Among the consequences of the personalization of politics, it must be highlighted the 
central role gained by political leaders within voters’ political reasoning. Empirical research 
in political cognition shows that the most diffuse political schema among contemporary voters 
is the one based on leaders (Miller et al., 1986; Sullivan et al., 1990). The reason is clear: 
ideologies, issues, and performance assessments are inherently political, and thus require 
more sophistication to understand (Pierce, 1993). Party leaders, on the contrary, can be easily 
evaluated using inferential strategies of person perception that are constantly employed in 
everyday life (Kinder, 1986; Rahn et al., 1990). Relying on implicit personality theory, 
individuals are therefore able to determine new judgments based on an overall character 
assessment when more concrete cognitions are required (Greene, 2001). On these bases, and 
in the light of the progressive personalization of politics, we hypothesize that among all 
possible sources of favorable attitudes towards the parties, those related to the party leader 
have become the strongest determinant of partisanship at the individual level. 
 




3. Britain, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands: Reasons of a Comparison 
Our research hypotheses will be tested through a comparative analysis of four 
established parliamentary democracies in Western Europe: Britain, Germany, Italy, and the 
Netherlands. The choice of these four countries (connoted by sharp differences in terms of 
electoral system, size of party system and structure of political competition) highlights many 
of the crucial variations in the structure of democratic politics, thus allowing for a broader 
based assessment of our research hypotheses.  
Italy. There are strong reasons to believe that our expectations can be by and large 
fulfilled within the Italian case. In the First Italian Republic (1946-1993), the stability of party 
identifications was especially accentuated by the tight link between primary groups and the 
main parties of that time (e.g., DC and PCI). In such context, partisanship was regarded as “a 
form of social embeddedness, a closure in distinctive and separate political sub-cultures and 
enclaves which Italian mass parties were able to bring about” (Bellucci, 2007: 58). Although 
the identity approach did provide a valuable explanation of the ties between voters and parties 
in pre-1994 Italy, the same approach does not seem appropriate for an account of the nature of 
mass partisanship in the Second Republic. Italy is in fact the only country among established 
industrial democracies to have recently experienced the simultaneous dissolution of almost all 
main parties from an election (1992) to another (1994). With the fall of Berlin Wall in 1989, 
the Cold War pattern that had marked Italian politics since the end of WW2 suddenly lost its 
historical meaning. In such context the old partitocrazia, already weakened by an erosion of 
the stable social cleavages on which it was based and eventually wiped out by Tangentopoli 
scandals, left the way to a new typology of post-ideological, highly ‘personalistic’ parties 
(Gunther and Diamond, 2003) – well exemplified by the sudden emergence of Silvio 
Berlusconi’s Forza Italia.  




Obviously, one should note that such abrupt pattern of party system transformation is 
definitely uncommon in the Western experience. In the wide majority of established European 
democracies, political parties did undergo a long, and at times hard, process of adaptation to 
the new context (i.e., widespread erosion of social cleavages, fall of ideologies, mediatization 
and personalization of politics) but by no means disappeared. It is for this reason that we 
decided to compare Italy with the British, Dutch and German cases. These countries are in 
fact marked by sharp differences vis-à-vis Italy in the developmental trajectory of their party 
systems (i.e., adaptation rather than change). If our research hypotheses were to be vindicated 
also against these three cases, this would rule out the uniqueness of the Italian experience (due 
to the party system breakdown of early 1990s) and boost our confidence in the role of 
systemic party transformation as causal determinant of the changing nature of partisan 
attachments.  
The period under analysis begins in the aftermath of the Berlin Wall fall and covers 
the last two decades. Our interest in this particular time frame relates to (a) the peculiar ways 
in which personalization have replaced socio-ideological aspects of the political competition 
and (b) the interesting patterns of aggregate partisanship in each of these countries. Let us 
briefly review these points in turn. 
Britain. Due to its historical legacy, Britain has long been considered to exemplify the 
archetypical class-based party system. In their pioneering study of voting behavior in Britain, 
Butler and Stokes (1969) depicted the British electorate as two large and stable blocs, with 
working-class voters on the Labour side, and middle-class on the Conservative one. To the 
progressive class dealignment of the 1970s (Crewe et al., 1977), both parties responded by 
employing brand-new catch-all electoral strategies. The increasing visibility of leaders within 
parties’ communication with voters became all the most obvious since the Thatcher’s years. 
Yet the best example of personalization among British parties is probably that of the New 




Labour. Under Tony Blair, the party cast off much of its ideological baggage (including the 
historic commitment to the public ownership of major industries) and transformed into an 
“exemplar of the modern electoral-professional competitor” (Webb, 2004: 44). From an 
organizational point of view, both Labour and Conservatives are nowadays denoted by 
extremely high levels of leadership autonomy and a thoroughly professionalized approach to 
political marketing (ibid.) that results in ever more personalized campaign strategies (Denver, 
2007).  
Germany. There are probably few words able to characterize better the politics of the 
Federal Republic of Germany than Parteienstaat and Kanzelerdemokratie. The first connotes 
the crucial role of political parties in the constitutional setting, while the second refers to the 
dominant figure of the Chancellor in the German system of governance (Saalfeld, 2000). 
After a long period of balance between the two, the last decades have witnessed a marked 
decline in the public image of political parties (Arzheimer, 2006) and a correspondingly 
growing exposure of the Chancellors (as well as that of individual candidates to the 
chancellorship) at the expense of their parties, especially during electoral campaigns. 
Although German campaigns have always been centered on candidates to some extent, it is 
only in the 1990s that the notion of personalization is, for the first time, discussed at length 
(Brettschneider and Gabriel, 2002). The charismatic figure of Helmut Kohl has been crucial 
in this respect, and his successful endurance on the political scene led ultimately his 
contenders and successors to follow suit. This was especially evident in the 2002 campaign, 
which large parties focused “almost exclusively” on their chancellor-candidates (Poguntke, 
2005). The increasingly central role of the personality features of political leaders on their 
parties’ appeal is further corroborated by analyses of party structures, which testify of an 
unambiguous adoption of leader-centered electoral strategies on the behalf of the major 
German parties (Gunther and Diamond, 2003).  




The Netherlands. Contrary to the aforementioned cases, the Netherlands are hardly a 
case in point with respect to personalization. The Dutch civil society has long been founded 
on pillars, and virtually all areas of social life, including politics, were organized along the 
principles of class and religion (Andeweg and Irwin, 2003). Accordingly, the voters’ 
relationship with parties was based on their belonging to the pillars, thus leaving little room 
for leading politicians’ personality to affect their political attitudes and behavior (Irwin and 
van Holsteyn, 1989). However, the erosion of pillars and the resulting deterioration of 
traditional bonds between parties and voters have led also Dutch parties to reshape their 
appeal on increasingly volatile voters by highlighting “the qualities of individual politicians”, 
and most notably the “managerial skills of their prime ministerial candidates” (Fiers and 
Krouwel, 2005: 151). A critical step towards the personalization of Dutch politics is 
represented by the 2002 election, which saw the entrance of Pim Fortuyn on the political 
scene. His flamboyant rhetoric gained him an unprecedented attention in the media 
(Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2003). Fortuyn can be credited with changing the Dutch political 
landscape to a substantial extent, and in particular the way in which politics is presented to the 
public. Nowadays, it is common for Dutch campaigns to be depicted as horse races between 
the major parties’ leaders (Fiers and Krouwel, 2005). Correspondingly, party structures have 
eventually converged around a small group of party leaders as key decision-makers within the 
party (Andeweg, 2000). 
 
<--- Figure 1 about here ---> 
 
Along with the peculiar patterns of personalization in their political systems, our 
interest in these four countries is also related to the interesting patterns of aggregate 
partisanship that are observed in the last two decades (see Figure 1). Against an international 




trend of partisan dealignment (Dalton, 2000), we find signs of substantial stability since the 
early 1990s in the Netherlands, and even a significant increase in Germany since the 2000s. 
The case of Italy is slightly more complex: there is a steady downward movement, began in 
the mid-1980s because of the growing disaffection with parties, and culminated with the fall 
of the First Republic. After a peak in 1996, probably due to the widespread enthusiasm with 
the new political experience, the figure gets progressively down to roughly 50 percent. 
Although the trend line speaks almost unequivocally of a constant erosion of partisan ties, we 
must also note the major restructuration undergone by the Italian party system in both early-
1990s and late-2000s – an occurrence that makes us indeed surprised of the substantial hold in 
the figure relative to aggregate partisanship. With respect to Britain, after a relatively long 
period of stability we observe a steady decline in the last decade (minus 10 percentage points 
in the period 1997-2005). Nonetheless, Figure 1 highlights that in 2005 four Britons out of 
five declare to feel close to one of the parties – this proportion being the highest amongst the 
four countries under analysis. 
It would thus seem that partisanship has remained somehow valuable to these 
countries’ electorates, and especially in the most recent decades. Bearing this in mind, we 
now turn to the empirical section of our analysis. 
 
4. Data and Methods 
In the empirical analysis, we will assess the determinants of individual partisanship 
with respect to the two main cleavage-based parties in each country in the period between 
1990 and the most recent national election for which National Election Study data is available 
(for study descriptions, see Appendix A). The parties under analysis are thus Labour and 
Conservatives for the British case, SPD and CDU for the German case, PvdA and CDA for 
the Dutch case. The abrupt changes in the Italian party system occurred in the early 1990s 




have led us to a slightly more difficult process of case selection. Eventually, we decided to 
base our choice on the criterion of electoral relevance. With respect to the socialist family, we 
therefore chose the Communist Party (PCI) along with its major heirs (e.g., Partito 
Democratico della Sinistra, Democratici di Sinistra, Partito Democratico), while on the right-
hand of the political spectrum, we picked Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia (since 2008: 
Popolo delle Libertà) as follower of the Christian Democracy’s (DC) electoral tradition. 
The dependent variable of our analysis relies on the root question of party 
identification battery in each survey. One notes that question wording is hardly comparable 
throughout countries (see Appendix B); however, nontrivial semantic similarities are found 
between the ways in which respondents are asked about their attachment to parties (‘leaning 
towards’ in Germany, ‘feeling closer to’ in Italy, ‘being an adherent of’ in the Netherlands, 
‘thinking of themselves as’ in Britain). Furthermore, question wording has been kept constant 
in each national survey, thus allowing for safe intra-country comparison. According to Dalton 
(2010), this question sacrifices “the notion of long-term partisan identity for a feeling of 
closeness to a party”, but at the same time taps “affinity to a party separate from the vote, and 
it can be used in systems with diverse party traditions” (159). 
The choice to stick to the directional component of partisanship alone (Holmberg, 
1994) is based on the very aim of this research – that is, understanding the reason why 
respondents “select a response that indicated they ‘think of themselves as’ X or Y” (Bartle 
and Bellucci, 2009: 201) in spite of the transient shifts to which the strength component is 
often subject (Miller, 1991). We have thus generated a number of dichotomous variables – 
one per party under analysis – coding ‘1’ respondents declaring to feel close to that specific 
party and ‘0’ all others. 
The independent variables included in the analysis correspond to the indicators that are 
supposed to tap both social and attitudinal partisanship. As to the former, we include the 




respondent’s frequency of church attendance (religious identity), subjective social class and 
trade union membership (class identity). We also control for standard socio-demographic 
variables (gender, age, and educational level). All variable codings are reported in Appendix 
C. For what concerns the attitudinal dimensions of partisanship, our analysis include 
indicators related to issue proximity (operationalized as the respondents’ placement on a left-
right scale ranging from ‘0-left’ to ’10-right’), party leader evaluations (thermometer scores 
on a scale from ‘0’ to ‘10’), and retrospective economic evaluations (respondents’ perception 
of the national economic situation in the last year, ranging from a value of ‘0’ when very 
negative to a value of ‘10’ if very positive).  
 A first hint of the growing correspondence between individual respondents’ evaluation 
of party leaders and their feelings of closeness to parties comes from the point-biserial 
correlation coefficients3 of these two variables as reported in Table 1. 
 
<--- Table 1 about here ---> 
 
With respect to the magnitude of the coefficients, the table shows a substantial increase 
throughout time. Admittedly, only two parties (SPD and Italian Centre-Right) feature a 
monotonic increase of the coefficients’ size. However, if one observes the mean values of the 
correlation coefficients relative to each decade, the increasing correspondence between 
partisanship and party leader evaluation emerges more clearly. With the only exception of 
British Conservatives, the relationship between party leader evaluations and partisanship is in 
fact stronger in the 2000s than it was in the 1990s for every other party under analysis. 
To be sure, correlation does not prove causation, and even if we have theoretical 
reasons – at least, for the cases at hand – to believe that the causal sequence between voters’ 
                                                 
3 The point-biserial correlation coefficient is a special case of Pearson in which one variable (either dependent or 
independent) is quantitative and the other variable is dichotomous (Howell, 2009). 




attitudes toward party leaders and partisanship runs from the former to the latter, we still need 
to rule out other potential explanations. To this purpose, a number of multivariate analyses are 
in order. 
The empirical analysis that follows consists in three steps. In the first part, we assess 
the ability of identity items to explain individual feelings of attachment to each of the parties 
under analysis. In our view the causal role of attitudes as determinants of alignment with 
parties can be illustrated, albeit only indirectly, by highlighting the manifest decline in terms 
of explanatory power on the behalf of identity items. If (more or less favorable) attitudes are 
to be interpreted as a consequence of previous party identifications, the latter must be based 
on pre-existing group identities. However, a clear lack of explanatory power by identity items 
– that is, a substantial absence of long-term social ties between parties and partisans – 
represents, in our opinion, a convincing evidence of the independent role of attitudes as 
drivers of partisan alignments. This part of the analysis is aimed at showing that, consistently 
with our preliminary hypothesis, partisan loyalties have shifted from a mere reflection of 
previous social and ideological identities to the result of individual attitudes towards more 
visible partisan objects.  
In the second part, we compare the relative strength of attitudinal items as statistical 
predictors of partisanship. In doing so, we show the growing impact of leader evaluations as 
opposed to other potential sources of attitudes (e.g., issue proximity, performance 
evaluations). Once ascertained the primacy of leader evaluations, we finally concentrate on 
the direction of the relationship between attitudes towards party leaders and individual 
feelings of attachment to parties. Using Granger’s concept of causality (which assumes that 
cause precedes effect) we demonstrate that leader evaluations at t1 are much more strongly 
related to partisanship at t2 than partisanship at t1 is to leader evaluations at t2 – thus providing 




substantial confirmation of the causal link hypothesized (e.g., from favorable party leader 
evaluations to partisanship).  
 
5. Findings 
In order to assess the enduring validity of the identity-based explanation of 
partisanship, we have run thirty-six logistic regression models (one for each party/year under 
analysis). In every instance, the dependent variable is a dummy coding ‘1’ the respondents 
identified with the party under analysis, and ‘0’ apartisans as well as identifiers with parties 
other than the one under scrutiny. We include as independent variables the indicators that are 
supposed to tap both social (union membership, subjective social class4) and religious 
(frequency of church attendance5) identities, plus the standard socio-demographic controls 
(gender, age, educational level). Table 2 presents the variance explained (Nagelkerke’s R-
squared) in the dependent variable by each of these models. 
 
<--- Table 2 about here ---> 
 
The key finding that emerges from the table is an overall decline of identity items’ 
ability to explain feelings of partisan attachment. Not all parties present a monotonic 
downwards development. Indeed, half of the parties under analysis (those from Italy and the 
Netherlands) do. With respect to the others, the movement looks either curvilinear (British 
Consevatives, German CDU) or purely trendless (British Labour, German SPD). Yet if we 
concentrate on the last column of the table, the overall trend appears rather more uniform. 
This column features the slope (b) of the line interpolating the values presented in the table 
                                                 
4 Not available in the German datasets. 
5 This variable is not included in the analysis of British parties (for a discussion of Britain’s uni-dimensional 
cleavage structure, see: Oskarson, 2005). 




for each party, and it is obtained by regressing the year of the survey on the corresponding 
value of the R-squared. In essence, it tells us the overall direction of the trend, which is 
negative in six out of eight cases and positive in two (British Conservatives, German CDU). 
Even more interesting to our purposes is to observe that each row (i.e., party) features the 
lowest value of the R-squared in the last time-point of the series, and that this lies below the 
critical threshold of .10 in six cases out of eight, and only slightly above in the remaining two 
(British Conservatives=.12; Dutch CDA=.17). 
 Based on the evidences presented, it would seem that the changing nature and content 
of partisan alignments is a widespread phenomenon in our four democracies. On the whole, 
this is connoted by a declining ability of identity items to explain partisanship. In the 
following step of the analysis, we will attempt to assess the relative power of various attitude 
forces in explaining partisan ties at the individual level, in order to verify whether – in 
accordance with our core research hypothesis – attitudes towards the party leader have 
actually become the strongest predictor of partisanship. 
To compare the relative ability of attitude items to explain feelings of closeness to the 
main two parties in each country, we use multinomial logistic regression analysis. We have 
run eighteen models (one per country/year). Partisans of centre-right parties are coded ‘1’ 
whereas respondents close to centre-left parties are coded ‘0’ (the latter stand as reference 
category). Supporters of other parties and apartisans are coded ‘2’ (contrast with the reference 
category is not shown). We include as predictors the batteries of identity items and socio-
demographic controls previously employed plus a battery of attitudinal items (left-right self 
placement; retrospective economic evaluation; evaluations of both party leaders6). Table 3 
shows the unstandardized regression estimates (b). To our purposes, is worth noting that all 
                                                 
6 The simultaneous inclusion of respondents’ evaluations of both leaders in the model rests on the idea that 
candidate assessments are comparative in nature (Rahn et al., 1990; Sullivan et al., 1990). In the wide majority 
of cases under scrutiny, the leaders of the two main parties are also the ‘natural’ candidates to the country’s 
premiership.  




coefficients relative to attitude items are comparable in magnitude (all variables are scaled on 
a range between ‘0’ and ‘10’).  
 
<--- Table 3 around here ---> 
 
To begin with, an overall assessment of the model fit is in order. Looking at the 
Nagelkerke’s coefficient of multiple determination, we observe a substantial uniformity in the 
various models’ explanatory power [Britain: .57 < R2 < .68; Germany: .48 < R2 < .62; Italy: 
.46 < R2 < .56; The Netherlands: .41 < R2 < .50]. This finding is of interest, since it 
demonstrates that to a decline in the predictive power of identity items does not correspond a 
parallel decrease on the behalf of the composite model – thus confirming the validity of our 
preliminary assumption (see above). 
Moving to the single attitudinal predictors of partisanship, we first note a 
differentiated impact of left-right position and leader evaluations, on the one hand, and 
retrospective economic evaluations, on the other hand. The former are in fact statistically 
significant in each model, while the latter do not seem to play a comparably strong part (this 
being particularly the case in the German and Italian cases). With respect to the relative 
contribution of the various predictors included in the attitude battery, we rely on the Wald 
statistic7 (with higher values indicating a stronger impact of the predictor on the dependent 
variable). Two countries conform fully to our expectations: Italy and the Netherlands. In both 
cases, in fact, we witness a substantial increase in the predictive power of leader evaluations. 
These are only modestly associated with the DV in the beginning of the time series, and it is 
                                                 
7 The Wald statistic in logistic regression is comparable to the t-test in linear regression, and tells us whether the 
b coefficient for the specific predictor is significantly different from zero (Field, 2009). In other words, is a 
measure of association between the independent and the dependent variable. Although this statistic tends to 
inflate the standard error when the regression coefficient is large, its use in the case at hand is justified by the 
substantially similar magnitude of the regression estimates.  




voters’ placement on the left-right scale to play the foremost part. Yet in the period between 
2002 (The Netherlands) and 2006 (Italy) the pattern is fully reversed, with both leaders’ 
evaluations featuring the highest value of the Wald statistic in the respective model. As to 
Britain and Germany, there is no linear pattern (in the former leader evaluations are by and 
large the key predictors; in the latter they always are) but conclusions are the same. In spite of 
the different leaders being evaluated, their different personalities, and the different political 
and institutional contexts in which these evaluations are taking place, our findings seem to 
point to the conclusion that nowadays individual feelings of attachment to parties in these four 
democracies are best explained by individuals’ attitudes towards party leaders.   
Additional evidence aimed at disentangling the causal direction of the link between 
leader evaluations and partisanship is presented in Table 4. We make use of Granger’s 
concept of causality, as already employed for similar purposes by Midtbø (1997) and Jenssen 
and Aalberg (2006). Based on the assumption that cause precedes effect (Granger, 1969), 
Granger’s causality test allows us to assess the actual point of departure in the relationship 
between party leader evaluation and partisanship. If the former is to be interpreted as causally 
prior to the latter, this should reflect in a stronger statistical association between leader 
evaluation at t1 and partisanship at t2 [L -> P], as compared to that between partisanship at t1 
and leader evaluation at t2 [P -> L]. This expectation is tested, for illustrative purposes, on the 
British (2005) and Italian (2006) cases8. As it turns out, the effect of leader evaluations at t1 
on partisanship at t2 (controlled for partisanship at t1) is in every instance stronger than the 
effect of partisanship at t1 on leader evaluation at t2 (controlled for leader evaluation at t1). 
Furthermore, the relative magnitude of these effects speaks unmistakably in favor of the 
                                                 
8  These are in fact the only two surveys (among those employed in the analysis) in which partisanship and 
leader evaluation questions have been asked to the same respondents in both pre-election and a post-election 
waves. In this analysis, the strength of partisan attachment is also taken into account. Partisanship is thus scored 
as follows: (0) respondent is not identified with the party; (1) respondent leans towards the party; (2) respondent 
is weakly attached to the party; (3) respondent is strongly attached to the party. 




hypothesized direction of the relationship. The [L -> P] coefficient overcomes in fact the [P -
> L] coefficient by a 2-to-1 factor in the case of Italian Left-Democrats and British 
Conservatives, by a 3-to-1 factor in the case of British Labour, and by a 6-to-1 factor in the 
case of Forza Italia. 
 
<--- Table 4 about here ---> 
 
6. Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we hope to have shown the substantial changes occurred in the last two 
decades in the origins and content of mass partisanship in Britain, Germany, Italy, and the 
Netherlands. Although the relatively few and recent points in time covered in our analysis did 
not allow to fully assess the long-term decline of pre-existing social identities as determinants 
of individual feelings of attachment to parties, we can nonetheless affirm that contemporary 
partisanship appears increasingly shaped by voters’ attitudes towards more visible partisan 
objects, such as issue stands and individual leaders. As argued at the beginning of this paper, 
we are inclined to impute such change to the process of transformation undergone by former 
class-mass parties in Western Europe as a response to the progressive erosion of traditional 
group affiliations. The decline of class and religious cleavages, along with the fall of 
ideologies, has forced these parties to reshape their appeal in order to extend the electoral 
basin beyond the socio-ideological cleavages to which they usually referred. Based on the 
idea that partisanship is responsive to the set of alternatives available in a political system, our 
analysis has indeed demonstrated that such transformations at the party level are clearly 
reflected in the dynamics of partisan alignment at the individual level – nowadays a matter of 
attitudes rather than identity. 




With respect to attitudes themselves, we have shown the primacy of leader evaluations 
as opposed to issue proximity and performance assessments. This finding links well with the 
notion of candidate-centered politics (Wattenberg, 1991), whereby voters’ attention is 
thought to shift from political parties and issues to individual politicians and their personal 
characteristics. The evidence presented here supports this notion, and elaborates on one of its 
crucial implications: namely, that different ways of thinking about politics can lead to 
different ways of relating to politics. A note of caution is in order. The main hypothesis of this 
study implies a causal relationship between leader evaluations and the development of 
partisan ties – a causal relationship which could only be tested on a handful of cases due to 
data availability. Broader panel studies will certainly supply more systematic evidence for the 
direction of this causal process (Holmberg, 2007). If any, the merit of this paper is that of 
having provided a different perspective on the relationship between parties, leaders, and 
voters’ political attitudes for future research in the field. 
What are the main implications of our findings? The first, and probably most notable 
implication relates to the relative place of partisanship and leader evaluations in the voting 
calculus of individual voters. Against the common wisdom that sees popular party leaders as a 
fundamental asset for their parties, the scientific community has been almost unanimous in 
downplaying the electoral effects of leader images in democratic elections, in virtue of the 
pre-eminent role played by pre-existing partisan affiliations on voters’ choice (King, 2002). 
The empirical evidence presented in this paper represents, in our opinion, a chance to resolve 
this tension. In the light of the increasingly tighter relationship between party leader 
evaluations and individual feelings of closeness to their parties, we believe that the electoral 
effect of an attractive leader needs not to be found in the net gain of votes due to his/her 
strictly personal appeal, but rather in the improved image in voters’ mind of the party he leads 




and ‘personifies’ (Curtice, 2003; McAllister, 2007; Barisione, 2009). In this sense, attitudes 
toward party leaders can be thought to affect voting choices through partisanship.  
 Overall, our findings point to the crucial role that political psychology can play in our 
understanding of democratic elections’ outcomes. In times of social and electoral 
dealignment, a psychological approach to the study of political attitudes and behavior at the 
micro-level can lead to new insights and supplement in many ways traditional explanations 
based on macro-sociological factors. Eventually, political psychology can also enhance our 
understanding of the mental processes underlying voters’ choice – the often neglected how 
question of electoral research (Houghton, 2009). If partisanship is to be conceived (as we 
argued in this paper) as an individual attitude, then the application of attitude-behavior models 
(Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975) to the study of its electoral consequences seems a fruitful way to 
go. Also, a more systematic assessment of the determinants of individual attitudes towards 
political leaders in parliamentary setting seems in order. Building on the vast amount of 
literature dealing with the American case, future research could investigate in more detail the 
extent to which the appraisal of prime ministerial candidates is best explained as memory-
based or rather as an online process (Lodge et al., 1995). The role of cognitive and affective 
forces should also be addressed more systematically. The latter, in particular, have been 
shown to play a key role in voters’ appraisals of presidential candidates (Caprara and 
Zimbardo, 2004). Finally, in an era in which political communication is dominated by ever 
more sophisticated marketing techniques, the effect of leaders’ facial appearances (Todorov et 
al., 2005) and non-verbal behavior (Masters and Sullivan, 1993) on voters should not be 
overlooked.  
There are reasons to believe that these (and related) topics will be at the core of 
electoral politics’ research agenda in the years to come. As hopefully shown by this article, a 
psychological perspective will most certainly add to our ability of answering such questions 




in political contexts increasingly connoted by partisan dealignment and the personalization of 
political power. 
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Table 1 – Point-biserial correlations: leader evaluation and partisanship (1990-2006) 
                                  
  Germany (1994-2005)   Italy (1990-2006)   The Netherlands (1994-1998)   United Kingdom (1992-2005)   
  Year SPD CDU   Year PCI/PDS DC/FI   Year PvdA CDA   Year Lab. Con.   
  1994 .414 .559   1990 .350 .350   1994 .236 .248   1992 .449 .566   
  1998 .422 .409   1996 .454 .389   1998 .204 .359   1997 .510 .541   
          
  Mean 1990s .418 .483   
Mean 
1990s .402 .370   
Mean 
1990s .220 .304   
Mean 
1990s .480 .554   
                                  
  2002 .468 .540   2001 .391 .415   2002 .265 .302   2001 .601 .482   
  
2005 .516 .457   2006 .435 .496   2006 .370 .352   2005 .460 .455 
  
  Mean 2000s .492 .499   
Mean 
2000s .413 .456   
Mean 
2000s .318 .326   
Mean 
2000s .531 .469   
                                  
Note: All correlation coefficients are significant at the .01 level (two-tailed) 
 




Figure 2 – Variance in partisanship explained by identity items 
                              
    1990 1992 1994 1996 1997 1998 2001 2002 2005 2006 2008 b   
  Britain                           
     Labour - ,14 - - ,09 - ,14 - ,08 - - -0,003   
      (3838,373)     (4511,288)   (1342,660)   (1649,835)         
     Conservatives - ,13 - - ,15 - ,17 - ,12 - - 0,001   
      (4063,385)     (3688,892)   (1012,770)   (1314,075)         
  Germany                           
     SPD ,03 - ,06 - - ,04 - ,04 ,04 - - -0,001   
    (1564,809)   (1246,942)     (1393,503)   (3611,570) (1865,083)         
     CDU ,07 - ,11 - - ,11 - ,14 ,07 - - 0,001   
    (1629,720)   (1371,305)     (1286,526)   (3272,452) (1773,499)         
  Italy                           
     PCI-PDS-PD ,14 - - ,10 - - ,05 - - ,05 ,04 -0,005   
    (972,320)     (2391,867)     (2056,589)     (1168,779) (2041,318)     
     DC-FI-PdL ,10 - - ,03 - - ,01 - - ,00 ,01 -0,006   
    (1186,240)     (1556,065)     (2459,147)     (1040,760) (1962,857)     
  The Netherlands                           
     PvdA - - ,13 - - ,13 - ,11 - ,04 - -0,001   
        (847,829)     (1059,395)   (914,278)   (2107,661)       
     CDA  - - ,32 - - ,32 - ,20 - ,17 - -0,014   
        (678,415)     (824,143)   (930,506)   (2070,992)       
                              
Note: Dependent variable: partisanship (dummy) – Predictors included:  church attendance, union membership, social class, controls (age, gender, education) 
Cell entries are Nagelkerke R-squared coefficients (-2 Log likelihood in parenthesis)




Table 3a – Multinomial Logistic Regression Estimates, Britain (1992-2005) 
  1992 (Lab vs. Con)   1997 (Lab vs. Con)   2001 (Lab vs. Con)   2005 (Lab vs. Con) 
  B SE p Wald   B SE P Wald   B SE p Wald   B SE p Wald 
Intercept 4,053 (,552) *** 53,960   4,075 (,501) *** 66,128   2,367 (,960) * 6,075   3,478 (,785) *** 19,623 
                                        
 Socio-demographics                                       
Age ,007 (,005)   1,720   -,004 (,005)   ,811   -,011 (,009)   1,588   ,014 (,007) * 3,973 
Gender -,057 (,175)   ,104   -,008 (,148)   ,003   ,001 (,277)   ,000   ,077 (,225)   ,117 
Education -,092 (,126)   ,533   -,096 (,099)   ,931   -,108 (,283)   ,145   -,161 (,139)   1,352 
                                        
 Identity Items                                       
Union Membership ,511 (,186) ** 7,525   ,536 (,156) ** 11,751   ,441 (,284)   2,401   1,339 (,304) *** 19,406 
Social Class -,996 (,196) *** 25,914   -1,301 (,154) *** 71,392   -1,651 (,282) *** 34,287   -1,350 (,236) *** 32,775 
                                        
 Attitude Items                                       
L-R Placement -,220 (,032) *** 47,707   -,688 (,044) *** 244,119   -,674 (,085) *** 62,922   -,588 (,068) *** 75,407 
Leader Eval. Lab. ,404 (,032) *** 160,341   ,518 (,032) *** 269,464   ,765 (,067) *** 131,427   ,554 (,046) *** 145,890 
Leader Eval. Con. -,597 (,038) *** 241,161   -,439 (,029) *** 222,262   -,452 (,065) *** 47,656   -,663 (,062) *** 112,880 
Economiy -,023 (,026)   ,783   -,071 (,021) ** 11,226   ,161 (,039) *** 17,174   ,094 (,048) * 3,866 
                                        
Cox & Snell R2 ,499   ,528   ,592   ,518 
Nagelkerke R2 ,566   ,598   ,679   ,584 
Chi-square (df) 1,036E3 (18)   1,810E3 (18)   762,235 (18)   802,750 (18) 
  p < .001   p < .001   p < .001   p < .001 
N 1498   2411   850   1101 
        Note: Contrast Labour vs. others is not shown. *** p < 0.001,* * p < 0.01, * p < .05 




Table 3b – Multinomial Logistic Regression Estimates, Germany (1990-2005) 
  1990 (SPD vs. CDU)   1994 (SPD vs. CDU)   1998 (SPD vs. CDU)   2002 (SPD vs. CSU)   2005 (SPD vs. CDU) 
  B SE p Wald   B SE p Wald   B SE p Wald   B SE p Wald   B SE p Wald 
Intercept 7,323 (1,357) *** 29,124   4,551 (1,031) *** 19,469   2,686 (,938) ** 8,191   1,497 (,649) * 5,320   2,070 (,886) * 5,461 
                                                  
 Socio-demographics                                                 
Age ,044 (,009) *** 23,202   -,010 (,008)   1,830   -,004 (,007)   ,301   ,002 (,004)   ,295   ,000 (,006)   ,005 
Gender ,076 (,280)   ,074   ,533 (,240) * 4,934   ,120 (,224)   ,287   ,079 (,135)   ,342   -,056 (,196)   ,083 
Education -,203 (,182)   1,246   -,224 (,170)   1,721   -,140 (,145)   ,932   -,246 (,150)   2,712   -,007 (,137)   ,003 
                                                  
 Identity Items                                                 
Union Membership ,855 (,377) * 5,152   ,701 (,317) * 4,900   ,511 (,301)   2,886   ,573 (,217) ** 6,970   -,223 (,312)   ,510 
Church Attendance -,553 (,106) *** 27,445   -,106 (,101)   1,115   -,387 (,093) *** 17,234   -,215 (,056) *** 14,942   -,184 (,077) * 5,772 
                                                  
 Attitude Items                                                 
L-R Placement -,512 (,072) *** 49,999   -,485 (,079) *** 37,888   -,294 (,057) *** 26,525   -,380 (,042) *** 81,029   -,505 (,061) *** 68,563 
Leader Eval. SPD ,560 (,057) *** 95,435   ,644 (,058) *** 122,894   ,598 (,048) *** 153,959   ,587 (,035) *** 274,302   ,753 (,052) *** 209,327 
Leader Eval. CDU -,967 (,098) *** 97,680   -,784 (,060) *** 172,024   -,456 (,044) *** 109,725   -,508 (,032) *** 251,905   -,518 (,046) *** 125,968 
Economiy -,022 (,059)   ,136   -,068 (,076)   ,798   -,176 (,056) ** 9,973   ,086 (,035) * 6,107   not available 
                                                  
Cox & Snell R2 ,549   ,541   ,419   ,495   ,541 
Nagelkerke R2 ,619   ,611   ,478   ,560   ,609 
Chi-square (df) 622,415 (18)   840,770 (18)   609,640 (18)   1,974E3 (18)   1,093E3 (16) 
  p < .001   p < .001   p < .001   p < .001   p < .001 
N 782   1079   1121   2743   1404 
          Note: Contrast SPD vs. others is not shown. *** p < 0.001,* * p < 0.01, * p < .05 




Table 3c – Multinomial Logistic Regression Estimates, Italy (1990-2008) 
  1990 (PCI vs. DC)   1996 (PDS vs. FI)   2001 (DS vs. FI)   2006 (DS vs. FI)   2008 (PD vs. PDL) 
  B SE p Wald   B SE P Wald   B SE p Wald   B SE p Wald   B SE p Wald 
Intercept 4,601 (1,178) *** 15,253   5,609 (,957) *** 34,325   4,192 (,956) *** 19,225   3,962 (1,362) ** 8,466   3,658 (1,151) ** 10,095 
                                                  
 Socio-demographics                                                 
Age -,019 (,010)   3,398   ,001 (,008)   ,027   -,004 (,007)   ,424   ,008 (,010)   ,585   ,007 (,006)   1,259 
Gender ,156 (,327)   ,229   -,538 (,225) * 5,709   -,147 (,212)   ,481   -,187 (,281)   ,443   -,445 (,222) * 4,037 
Education -,112 (,220)   ,259   -,057 (,149)   ,146   -,042 (,142)   ,089   -,118 (,193)   ,373   -,018 (,145)   ,015 
                                                  
 Identity Items                                                 
Union Membership -,356 (,133) ** 7,123   -,082 (,084)   ,945   -,052 (,081)   ,409   ,055 (,104)   ,280   -,006 (,073)   ,006 
Social Class -,514 (,120) *** 18,402   -,154 (,079)   3,742   -,130 (,073)   3,132   -,067 (,102)   ,438   ,029 (,072)   ,162 
Church Attendance ,354 (,347)   1,040   ,776 (,280) ** 7,687   ,991 (,283) *** 12,286   -,139 (,392)   ,125   ,497 (,626)   ,631 
                                                  
 Attitude Items                                                 
L-R Placement -,680 (,086) *** 62,596   -,509 (,059) *** 73,259   -,571 (,064) *** 79,259   -,294 (,089) ** 10,845   -,499 (,061) *** 66,116 
Leader Eval. (Left) ,395 (,071) *** 30,499   ,636 (,061) *** 107,736   ,503 (,059) *** 73,032   ,606 (,083) *** 52,724   ,732 (,065) *** 128,476 
Leader Eval. (Right) -,391 (,075) *** 27,139   -,815 (,070) *** 135,102   -,783 (,059) *** 173,767   -,798 (,088) *** 82,196   -,855 (,065) *** 173,001 
Economiy ,096 (,043) * 4,970   -,026 (,039)   ,424   ,167 (,057) ** 8,716   -,124 (,082)   2,302   -,026 ,065   ,157 
                                                  
Cox & Snell R2 ,394   ,458   ,425   ,433   ,460 
Nagelkerke R2 ,463   ,558   ,521   ,524   ,546 
Chi-square (df) 349,576 (20)   1,215E3 (20)   1,173E3 (20)   641,465 (20)   1,096E3 (20) 
  p < .001   p < .001   p < .001   p < .001   p < .001 
N 698   1984   2121   1132   1780 
          Note: Contrast centre-left parties vs. others is not shown. *** p < 0.001,* * p < 0.01, * p < .05




Table 3d – Multinomial Logistic Regression Estimates, The Netherlands (1994-2006) 
  1994 (PvdA vs. CDA)   1998 (PvdA vs. CDA)   2002 (PvdA vs. CDA)   2006 (PvdA vs. CDA) 
  B SE p Wald   B SE p Wald   B SE p Wald   B SE p Wald 
Intercept 3,185 (1,661)   3,679   ,243 (1,778)   ,019   
-
1,941 (1,620)   1,435   2,196 (1,186)   3,431 
                                        
 Socio-demographics                                       
Age -,008 (,010)   ,661   -,020 (,011)   3,714   ,014 (,009)   2,046   ,001 (,006)   ,016 
Gender ,342 (,324)   1,119   -,600 (,314)   3,647   ,317 (,286)   1,231   -,409 (,194) * 4,460 
Education ,020 (,152)   ,018   -,066 (,165)   ,163   ,092 (,147)   ,392   -,100 (,092)   1,186 
                                        
 Identity Items                                       
Union Membership ,821 (,358) * 5,268   ,610 (,338)   3,253   ,242 (,298)   ,658   -,168 (,237)   ,507 
Social Class -,070 (,169)   ,172   -,554 (,184) ** 9,066   -,174 (,165)   1,109   -,049 (,106)   ,211 
Church Attendance -,691 (,116) *** 35,807   -,867 (,122) *** 50,298   -,635 (,122) *** 26,910   -,365 (,053) *** 47,930 
                                        
 Attitude Items                                       
L-R Placement -,497 (,074) *** 45,085   -,565 (,086) *** 43,150   -,270 (,080) ** 11,425   -,362 (,055) *** 43,760 
Leader Eval. PvdA ,440 (,099) *** 19,644   ,614 (,104) *** 35,014   ,641 (,081) *** 62,429   ,680 (,069) *** 98,231 
Leader Eval. CDA -,623 (,105) *** 34,942   -,790 (,095) *** 69,452   -,737 (,088) *** 70,287   -,674 (,072) *** 87,384 
Economiy -,079 (,039) * 4,181   ,109 (,036) ** 9,073   ,064 (,031) * 4,289   -,121 (,023) *** 27,503 
                                        
Cox & Snell R2 ,318   ,352   ,297   ,386 
Nagelkerke R2 ,442   ,502   ,405   ,462 
Chi-square (df) 484,494 (20)   667,130 (20)   499,429 (20)   945,542 (20) 
  p < .001   p < .001   p < .001   p < .001 
N 1265   1536   1418   1937 
        Note: Contrast PvdA vs. others is not shown. *** p < 0.001,* * p < 0.01, * p < .05 




Table 4 – Granger’s test of causality 
Party/leader DVpost-election IVs pre-election B R2 N 
Britain, 2005 
Labour Partisanship T2 Partisanship T1 ,238* ,15 2336 
    Leader Eval. T1   [L -> P] ,239*     
 
Tony Blair Leader Eval. T2 Partisanship T1    [P -> L] ,068* ,61 2321 
    Leader Eval. T1 ,762*     
            
Conservatives Partisanship T2 Partisanship T1 ,281* ,15 2229 
    Leader Eval. T1   [L -> P] ,198*     
 
Michael Howard Leader Eval. T2 Partisanship T1    [P -> L] ,111* ,43 2195 
    Leader Eval. T1 ,611*     
            
Italy, 2006 
Democratici di Sinistra Partisanship T2 Partisanship T1 ,489* ,36 1207 
    Leader Eval. T1   [L -> P] ,198*     
 
Piero Fassino Leader Eval. T2 Partisanship T1    [P -> L] ,109* ,49 1161 
    Leader Eval. T1 ,642*     
            
Forza Italia Partisanship T2 Partisanship T1 ,536* ,40 1318 
    Leader Eval. T1   [L -> P] ,161*     
 
Silvio Berlusconi Leader Eval. T2 Partisanship T1    [P -> L] ,026* ,56 1286 
    Leader Eval. T1 ,738*     
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1992-01  Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Hermann Schmitt, Bernhard Wessels and Tanja Binder. 
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2005  Harold Clarke, David Sanders, Marianne Stewart and Paul Whitely. British 




1990-8  Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Hermann Schmitt, Bernhard Wessels and Tanja Binder. 
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2002  Jurgen Falter, Oscar Gabriel and Hans Rattinger. Political Attitudes, Political 
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1990 Arturo Parisi and Hans Schadee. Italian National Election Study 1990. Istituto 
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Istituto Cattaneo, Bologna. 
  
2006 Paolo Bellucci and Paolo Segatti. Italian National Election Study. Istituto 
Cattaneo, Bologna. 
 






1994 Stichting Kiezersonderzoek Nederland. Nationaal kiezersonderzoek 1994. 
Netherlands Institute for Scientific Information Services, Steinmetz Archive. 
P1208 Data file. 





1998 Kees Aarts, Henk van der Kolk and Marlies Kamp. Dutch Parliamentary Election 
Study 1998. Netherlands Institute for Scientific Information Services, Steinmetz 
Archive. P1415 Data file. 
 
2002 Galen Irwin, Joop van Holsteyn and Jan den Ridder. Dutch Parliamentary 
Election Study 2002-2003. Netherlands Institute for Scientific Information 
Services, Steinmetz Archive. P1628 Data file. 
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Appendix B – Party Identification Question Wording 
 
Britain 




“Many people in the Federal Republic lead toward a particular party for a long time, although 




“Is there any political party that you feel closer to than others?” 
 
The Netherlands 
“Many people think of themselves as adherents of a particular party, but there are many other 
people who do not regard themselves as such. How about you, do you regard yourself as an 
adherent of a political party or don’t you?” 








Gender: Male (0), Female (1) 
 
Age: Age in years 
 
Educational Level 
[DE] Primary education (1), Secondary education (2), University education (3) 
[IT] Elementary school (1), Middle school (2), High school (3), University (4) 
[NL] Scale from lowest (1) to highest (5) 





Frequency of church attendance 
[DE] Never (1), Once a year (2), Several times a year (3), Once a month or more (4), Once a week 
or more (5) 
[IT] [NL] Never (1), 2-3 times a year (2), Once a month (3), 2-3 times a month (4), Once a week 
or more (5) 
 
Union membership 
No (0), Yes (1) 
 
Social class 
[IT] Working class (1), Rural petite bourgeoisie (2), Urban petite bourgeoisie (3), White collar 
middle class (4), Bourgeoisie (5) 
[NL] Working class (1), Upper working class (2), Middle class (3), Upper middle class (4), Upper 
class (5) 





Left-right self placement 
Scale from 0 (‘left’) to 10 (‘right’) 
 
Leader evaluations 
Scale from 0 (‘completely negative evaluation’) to 10 (‘completely positive evaluation’) 
 
Evaluation of the national economic situation in the last year 
Scale from 0 (‘really bad’) to 10 (‘really well’) 
